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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
LAW: The Controlled Substance Act does not authorize the
Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide permitted under state law.
FACTS: In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize assisted
suicide. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act ("ODWDA") exempts
from civil or criminal liability state-licensed physicians who, in
compliance with the ODWDA's specific safeguards, dispense or
prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill
patient. The Controlled Substance Act ("CSA"), a federal statute,
allows these particular drugs to be available only by written
prescription from a registered physician. In 1971, the United States
Attorney General ("Attorney General") promulgated a regulation that
requires all prescriptions to be issued for a "legitimate medical
purpose" ("Regulation"). In 2001, the Attorney General issued an
interpretive rule that declared that using controlled substances to
assist suicide is not a "legitimate medical practice" and that
dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is unlawful under the
CSA ("Interpretive Rule" or "Rule"). The State of Oregon, a
physician, a pharmacist, and some terminally ill patients living in
Oregon challenged the Rule. The district court permanently enjoined
enforcement of the Rule, and the Ninth Circuit invalidated the Rule.
The federal government appealed.
ANALYSIS:
An administrative rule interpreting the issuing
agency's own ambiguous regulation may receive substantial
deference under Auer. Here, the Attorney General's Interpretive
Rule is not entitled to Auer deference as an interpretation of the
Regulation because the Regulation merely restated the terms of the
CSA. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its
own words when it does not use its own expertise and experience to
formulate the regulation.
An interpretation of an ambiguous statute may be afforded
substantial deference under Chevron if it appears that the
administrative official promulgated the rule pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress. Here, the Rule was not entitled to Chevron
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deference. Congress delegated to the Attorney General only the
authority to promulgate rules relating to registration and control of
the dispensing of controlled substances, but not to declare an entire
class of activity a criminal violation of the CSA. The Rule purports
to declare that using controlled substances for physician-assisted
suicide is a crime, which goes beyond the Attorney General's
statutory power to register or deregister physicians.
The Interpretive Rule is entitled to Skidmore deference, under
which it is given respect only to the extent that it has the power to
persuade. The Attorney General's opinion, however, is unpersuasive
under Skidmore. The CSA and case law support the conclusion that
Congress did not intend the CSA to regulate the practice of medicine
generally beyond barring doctors from using their prescriptionwriting powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and
trafficking. More specifically, the CSA does not authorize the
Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide, as authorized by
ODWDA. If Congress had intended to give this authorization to the
Attorney General, it would have done so by explicit statutory
language.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT:
Doctors practicing medicine in states that permit
physician-assisted suicides may write prescriptions to "assist"
without a federal criminal charge under the CSA. The Attorney
General may only issue a rule criminalizing these prescriptions if
Congress expands the authority granted to the Attorney General in
the CSA.
Lockhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 699 (2005).
LAW: The United States may offset Social Security benefits to
collect a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over ten
years.
FACTS: James Lockhart failed to repay federally insured student
loans incurred between 1984 and 1989. The Debt Collections Act of
1982 ("DCA") provides that an agency can collect an outstanding
debt by administrative offset. In 2002, the federal government began
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withholding a portion of his social security payments to offset his
debt, some of which was more than ten years delinquent. Lockhart
sued alleging that the DCA's ten year statute-of-limitations barred
the offset. Lockhart argued that when Congress eliminated time
limitations as to various student loans in 1991 by enacting the Higher
Education Technical Amendments ("Amendments"), it did not intend
to repeal the DCA's statute of limitations as to offsets against social
security benefits since debt collection by social security offset was
not authorized until 1996 with the enactment of the Debt Collection
Improvement Act ("DCIA"). The district court dismissed the
complaint, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
ANALYSIS: The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of
the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason
for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning. Although the DCIA
retained the DCA's general ten-year bar on offset authority, the
Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception to the DCA
time bar in the student loan context. The Court declined to read any
meaning into a failed 2004 congressional effort to amend the DCA to
explicitly authorize offset of debts over ten years old because of the
danger in interpreting a prior statute based on failed legislative
proposals.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT:
Social security benefits may be offset to pay off
outstanding federally insured student loans no matter how old the
debt.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Local 15. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 429 F.3d 651 (7th
Cir. 2005).
LAW: Without a valid distinction between those locked out and
those allowed to work, an employer has no legitimate and substantial
business justification for a partial lockout during collective
bargaining negotiations.
Without a legitimate and substantial
business justification, an employer's unfair labor practice violates the
National Labor Relations Act.
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FACTS: On June 28, 2001, Local 15, International Brotherhood of
Electrical workers, AFL-CIO (the "Union") began a strike against
Midwest Generation EME, LLC ("Midwest") over stalled
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. Midwest
continued its business during the strike, relying on supervisors,
contractors, and eight employees who refused to strike. After failed
negotiations, on August 31, 2001, the Union voted to end their strike
and offered to return to work unconditionally. On September 6,
2001, Midwest informed the Union that it was instituting a lockout
against striking employees not including the 61 employees who were
initially part of the strike but later offered to return to work
("crossovers"). The lockout continued until the parties reached a
collective bargaining agreement on October 22, 2001.
In response to an unfair labor practice charge filed by the
Union, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") issued a
complaint against Midwest on March 7, 2002 for unfair labor
practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act"). The complaint alleged that Midwest committed an unfair
labor practice by refusing to reinstate employees who were on strike
at the time of an unconditional offer to return to work, while allowing
other workers who had already returned or planned to return to work
access to their jobs. The parties waived an ALJ hearing and
stipulated to the record that the only issue for resolution was whether
Midwest violated the Act by locking out or refusing to reinstate those
employees who were on strike at the time of the Union's
unconditional offer to return to work, while reinstating and/or not
locking out the crossovers. The NLRB found no violation of the Act.
ANALYSIS: The Act prohibits employers from interfering with
employees' rights to engage in activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining. If the employer has no legitimate and substantial
business justification for the interference, then the employer violates
the Act.
Midwest's operational needs are not a sufficient business
justification for instituting the partial lockout. The record indicates
that Midwest's operations were successfully maintained throughout
the strike without the use of crossovers or employees who chose not
to participate in the strike at all. The last 6 crossovers did not even
start work until after the Union's August 31 unconditional offer to
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return to work, which shows that they were unnecessary for
continued operations.
Bringing economic pressure on Union members to abandon
the Union's bargaining demands is also an insufficient business
justification for instituting the partial lockout. Midwest presented no
direct correlation between an employee's non-participation in the
strike and a lack of support for the Union's demands. In addition to
abandoning the Union's bargaining position, there can be several
reasons why an employee might choose to cross a picket line, such as
financial motivations, personal relationships with employers, and
indifference.
Further, when Midwest announced the selective
lockout, all of the employees on strike had already offered to return
to work unconditionally.
Without a valid distinction between those locked out and
those allowed to work, Midwest had no legitimate and substantial
business justification for the partial lockout.
HOLDING: The NLRB's decision is reversed and remanded to
determine whether Midwest's unfair labor practices coerced the
Union and its members into ratifying the contract offer, thereby
voiding the collective bargaining agreement.
IMPACT: The NLRB's findings must be rational and consistent
with the National Labor Relations Act, and must be supported by
argument and evidence. A reviewing court is not obliged to defer to
the NLRB's decision when that decision is inconsistent with a
statutory mandate or congressional policy underlying a statute.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT

Native Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Serv., 418 F.3d
953 (9th Cir. 2005).
LAW: Resource plans, permits, contracts, and other instruments for
the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands must be
consistent with land management plans.
FACTS: The Helena National Forest includes an area of the Elkhorn
Mountains and is managed by the Helena National Forest Plan
("HNF Plan"). The HNF Plan contains standards relating to the
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security of big game species such as elk. The Elkhom Mountains are
home to the only designated Wildlife Management Unit in our
National Forest System, the Elkhorn Wildlife Unit, which was
created by the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service'). The
Elkhom Wildlife Unit has its own standards with which any sitespecific project must comply. Specifically, the Forest Service is only
to consider "land management activities" in the Elkhorn Wildlife
Unit when "they are compatible with management direction for
wildlife."
In 2000, the Forest Service proposed the Elkhom Project, a
wildlife improvement project involving a timber sale within the
Helena National Forest and the Elkhom Wildlife Unit. The Native
Ecosystems Council and the Ecology Center (collectively, "NEC")
filed an administrative appeal, which was denied. NEC then filed
suit in district court arguing that the Forest Service's approval of the
Elkhorn Project was arbitrary and capricious, and, therefore, in
violation of various federal statutes. The district court granted the
Forest Service's motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency action only
if it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." To have not acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, the agency must present a rational basis for its
conclusions.
The HFN Plan requires that each elk herd in the Helena
National Forest have at least thirty-five percent "hiding cover." This
hiding cover percentage must be calculated over the entire elk herd
unit or drainage, or only over the summer range portion of that elk
herd unit. Rather than calculating a hiding cover for the elk herd's
entire unit or drainage, the Forest Service calculated the hiding cover
over only the sections of the elk herd within the Helena National
Forest boundaries. The agency's interpretation is inconsistent with
the HNF Plan because the HNF Plan does not allow the Forest
Service to exclude private and other non-HNF public lands within the
elk herd's range from its hiding cover calculation perimeters. Also,
the Forest Service presented a calculation over the elk herd's summer
range that was inconsistent with previous hiding cover analyses, but
failed to present any rational explanation for the differences.
Although the Forest Service calculations need not be perfect, it is
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unclear from the record whether or not the Forest Service complied
with the hiding cover standard. Because the record does not include
a rational basis for the Forest Service's conclusion that the project
will not violate the HNF Plan's hiding cover standard, the agency's
approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of
the National Forest Management Act.
By using a hiding cover calculation that was inconsistent with
that required by the HNF Plan, the Forest Service did not take a "hard
look" at the project's true effect. The Forest Service also failed to
inform the public of the project's environmental impact. Thus, the
Forest Service also violated the National Environmental Policy Act.
HOLDING:
remanded.

The district court's judgment is reversed and

IMPACT: Environmental groups concerned with administrative
agency adherence to land management plans are afforded great
protection. Agencies must present, in the record, well-reasoned
analyses for its decisions.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT

United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006).
LAW: "Navigable waters," as used in the Clean Water Act, includes
tributaries of navigable waters.
FACTS: The Wind River originates in Wyoming's Wind River
Range and flows southeast, eventually flowing east into the Missouri
River. John Hubenka ("Hubenka") was concerned with protecting his
nearby ranch and wanted to ensure that the river's north bank would
not erode. In 1995, he worked with the United States Army Corps of
Engineers (the "Corps") to construct a stabilization project that
successfully protected the north bank from erosion.
At some point in the late 1990's or early in 2000, the river's
primary course shifted from the "north channel" to a new "south
channel" for reasons that are unclear. In March 2000, Hubenka had
three new dikes constructed to prevent water from the south channel
from returning to the north channel. None of the dikes were
authorized by a permit from the Corps.
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Hubenka was charged with three violations of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), which governs "navigable waters." The government
alleged that each of the dikes constituted a knowing discharge of
pollutants into the Wind River. A jury convicted Hubenka on all
three counts. Hubenka appealed arguing that the Corps exceeded its
jurisdiction under the CWA by regulating discharges into the Wind
River, a non-navigable water, and exceeded its statutory authority in
issuing a regulation under which the CWA applied not just to
navigable waters but also to tributaries of navigable waters.
ANALYSIS: Under the two-step Chevron rule in cases involving an
agency's interpretation of a statute, a reviewing court gives effect to
the express intent of Congress; if the statute is silent or ambiguous,
however, the court defers to the agency's interpretation so long as it
is permissible. The Supreme Court has observed that Congress's
broad defmition of "navigable waters" to mean "waters of the United
States" evidences an intent to exercise its powers to regulate some
waters that would not be deemed "navigable" under the classical
understanding of that term.
The term "navigable waters" is
ambiguous since the CWA does not reveal the extent to which nonnavigable waters may be regulated. Nonetheless, a "significant
nexus" between the subject water and a navigable water is sufficient
to establish jurisdiction under the CWA. Congress enacted the
statute to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation's waters. Given this congressional concern,
the potential for pollutants to migrate from a tributary to navigable
waters downstream constitutes a "significant nexus" between those
waters. Accordingly, the Corps' interpretation of "waters of the
United States" to include tributaries of navigable waters is a
permissible construction. Thus, deference is given to the Corp's
interpretation of the statute.
The court also held that Hubenka's use of river bottom
materials to construct dikes involved a discharge of pollutants within
the CWA, the government was not required to prove a deleterious
effect on waters downstream, and evidence of Hubenka's prior
encounters with the Corps was admissible to prove a knowing
violation of the CWA.
HOLDING: The district court's judgment is affirmed.
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IMPACT: This decision affords greater environmental protection by
recognizing a broader definition of "navigable waters." This is
especially important for environmentalists who are concerned that the
Supreme Court may soon dramatically cutback the reach of the Clean
Water Act as there are two cases before the Court this term, Rapanos
v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for
which each petition was filed by parties appealing the extent of the
federal government's reach under the Clean Water Act.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
LAW: Attorneys engaged in the practice of law are not "financial
institutions" within the meaning of Federal Financial Modernization
Act provisions requiring protection of consumer financial
information.
FACTS: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act
(the "Act") contains privacy protection provisions that apply to
"financial institutions," which the Act defines as "any institution the
business of which is engaging in financial activities as described in
§ 1843(k) identifies institutions
section 1843(k) of Title 12."
engaged in non-banking activities that are financial in nature.
Pursuant to statutorily-granted authority, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") issued regulations that
defined a "financial institution" as "[a]n institution that is
significantly engaged in financial activities."
Various bar associations sent a letter to the FTC asking
whether the Commission considered the Act to govern attorneys
engaged in the practice of law, and, if so, requesting exemption from
the Act. The FTC rejected the request for exemption, and purported
to hold the position that the Act regulated attorneys engaged in the
practice of law.
The bar associations filed actions for declaratory judgment.
The district court held that the Commission's attempt to regulate
attorneys under the Act was inconsistent with the Act and arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). The FTC appealed.
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ANALYSIS: Deference to an administrative agency's interpretation
of a statute under Chevron is warranted only where there is an
ambiguity in the statute and the ambiguity is such as to make it
appear that Congress either explicitly or implicitly delegated
authority to cure the ambiguity. There is no ambiguity in the statute
because Congress has left no gap for the agency to fill. It is a stretch
to read the congressional definition of a "financial institution" as
including an attorney. Although the FTC's regulatory definition
includes the activities of providing real estate settlement services and
providing tax planning and tax preparation services in which
attorneys sometimes engage, Congress has never granted the FTC
authority to regulate the practice of law. If it intended to do so,
Congress would have left an ambiguity in the question of whether an
attorney is a "financial institution" for purposes of the Act. Thus, the
court owes the agency no Chevron deference.
Even if the court does owe deference to the agency's
interpretation, it is not sufficiently reasonable to survive the
deference. The regulation of the practice of law is traditionally a
matter left to the states. If Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between state governments and the federal
government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.
HOLDING: The district court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: The FTC does not have wide discretion to regulate any
entity engaged in financial activities under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act. To regulate attorneys as "financial
institutions," the FTC must have specific authority to do so by from
Congress.
NASD v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
LAW: The adjudicatory arm of the National Association of Security
Dealers ("NASD") is not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of
§ 25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when the Securities
and Exchange Commission reverses a decision it has made.
FACTS: NASD is a self-regulatory organization with express
statutory authority to adjudicate actions against members accused of
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violating federal securities laws. In this case, an NASD member was
accused of engaging in a manipulative scheme in violation of § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). The
NASD hearing panel concluded that the member had not manipulated
the market. On appeal, the National Adjudicatory Council ("NAC")
reversed the hearing panel, and the member was disciplined
accordingly. The member appealed to the SEC, which concluded
that the evidence in the record did not establish the alleged
manipulation, and it set aside NASD's sanctions. NASD petitioned
for judicial review under § 25(a) of the Exchange Act as a "person
aggrieved by a final order of the [SEC]."
ANALYSIS: During the nearly seventy years that self-regulatory
organizations have been recognized under the Exchange Act,
Congress has never granted NASD a statutory right to seek judicial
review of a SEC decision reversing disciplinary action taken by
NASD. No court has ever suggested that such review is possible, and
the court found no case in which NASD has ever petitioned for such
review. The court found no reason to allow it to do so now.
HOLDING: NASD's petition for review is dismissed.
IMPACT: Judicial review under § 25(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is unavailable to NASD in its adjudicative capacity. The
right to review of an SEC decision is restricted to persons whom the
agency regulates and affects adversely, and not to a lower tribunal.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NEW

YORK

Karpova v. Snow, 402 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
LAW: The Iraqi Sanctions Regulations prohibit "human shield"
activities in Iraq and the solicitation of funds for use in paying for
illicit travel to Iraq.
FACTS: In February 2003, Judith Karpova traveled to Iraq and
served as a "human shield" in the event of a U.S. invasion of Iraq.
As a human shield, Karpova's mission was to protect the Iraqi
infrastructure by going to sites and either publicizing the threat to
them or physically remaining on the sites and protecting them with
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her life. When she returned to the United States, the Department of
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") imposed a
$6,700 civil penalty against Karpova for exporting services to Iraq
and engaging in unauthorized travel-related transactions in Iraq in
violation of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations (the "Regulations").
Karpova challenged the penalty, and the defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS: The OFAC's two interpretations are owed great
deference because they relate to foreign relations. First, the OFAC
sanctioned Karpova for exporting services to Iraq in violation of the
Regulations. Since the Regulations do not define the term "services,"
the court deferred to the OFAC's interpretation. When considering
the dictionary definitions of "service," the OFAC's interpretation that
Karpova's human shield activities in Iraq are "services" is
reasonable. Second, the OFAC sanctioned Karpova for engaging in
unauthorized travel-related transactions in Iraq in violation of the
Regulations. Although Karpova was hosted by an Iraqi nongovernmental agency once she arrived in Iraq, there was ample
evidence that before she arrived in Iraq she solicited funds to pay for
her trip. It is not unreasonable for the OFAC to interpret the
provisions prohibiting transactions to include prohibiting solicitation
of funds for use in paying for illicit travel to Iraq. Karpova cannot
assert the journalistic activity exemption because she went to Iraq in
capacities other than as a writer - in particular, as a human shield.
Even if she were to qualify, the exemption expressly excludes "travel
transactions related to any other activity in Iraq," and some of
Karpova's activities were clearly not journalistic in nature. Thus, the
sanctions against Karpova were not imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously.
Also, the Regulations do not exceed presidential authority
because they are supported by International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, the United Nations Participation Act, the Iraqi Sanctions
Act, and two Executive Orders.
Further, the APA has never been construed to grant to any
court the power to review the wisdom of policy decisions of the
President because matters relating to foreign relations are exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government.
The court also found that Karpova was not deprived of due
process despite the lack of a testimonial hearing because there is no
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requirement that oral testimony be heard in every administrative
proceeding. Furthermore, the Regulations did not deprive Karpova
of her Fifth Amendment right to travel or her First Amendment right
to freedom of speech.
HOLDING: Karpova's complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
IMPACT: Agency interpretations that relate to foreign relations are
afforded especially high deference. Thus, United States citizens or
residents who travel to Iraq must be certain that any services
performed in Iraq are specifically authorized by the Regulations.
Even if the main purpose of their travels is for an expressly
authorized activity such as donating food in humanitarian
circumstances or donating supplies intended strictly for medical
purposes, any service that is not expressly authorized to be exported
to Iraq will result in a civil penalty against that person. Journalists
who travel to Iraq must also be wary that all of their activities are
journalistic in nature to be able to claim the journalistic activity
exemption to the Regulations.
MARYLAND STATE COURT

Mont2omery County v. Post, 888 A.2d 1224 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2005).
LAW:
Although an administrative agency has the initial
responsibility for transmitting its hearing board's record to a
reviewing court when the hearing board's decision is appealed, the
petitioner ultimately bears the responsibility for compliance with the
rules governing transmittal of a record.
FACTS: The Director of the Animal Services Division declared that
Carter Post's dog was potentially dangerous and ordered Post to keep
the dog muzzled and on a non-retractable nylon or leather leash when
off Post's property. Post appealed to the Animal Matters Hearing
Board for Montgomery County ("Board"), which affirmed the
Director's decision. Post then appealed to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, which reversed the Board's decision for failure
of the Board to give notice to the parties and to transmit timely a
record of the Board proceeding. Montgomery County appealed
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contending that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying its
motion for reconsideration without applying the usual standard of
review applicable to decisions of administrative agencies.
ANALYSIS: A reviewing court should defer to the administrative
agency's fact-fimding and drawing of inferences if they are supported
by the record. In order to conduct a judicial review under the
applicable standard, a court must have the administrative record.
Here, the circuit court did not have the record at the time it reversed
the Board's decision, and while it had the record at the time it denied
Montgomery Count's motion for reconsideration, it did not review
the record or, at least, did not base its decision on a review of the
record.
Although an administrative agency has the initial
responsibility for transmitting the record to the circuit court, Post
bore the responsibility for compliance with the rules. The penalty for
noncompliance is dismissal of the petition, unless the noncompliance
was not caused by the petitioner. Here, the Board caused the
noncompliance by failing to send notice of the petition for judicial
review to the parties before it and failed to transmit the record to the
circuit court. So dismissal of Post's petition would have been
inappropriate. Post, however, should have followed up with the
agency; if Post had done so, it would have been appropriate for the
circuit court to extend the time for the agency to comply with the
rules including transmittal of the record.
HOLDING: The circuit court's judgment is reversed and remanded
so that the court may perform a judicial review in accordance with
the applicable standard.
IMPACT: Petitioners to administrative agency decisions cannot
simply rely on the agency to transmit the record, but must follow up
with the agency to ensure compliance.
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NEW JERSEY STATE COURT

D.R. Horton, Inc. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 891 A.2d 1253
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
LAW: A statutory deadline for a party requesting a hearing to
contest administrative agency action is subject to the substantial
compliance doctrine.
FACTS: On November 2, 2004, D.R. Horton, Inc. ("D.R. Horton")
received notice from the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") of a penalty assessment for alleged violations of
regulations under the Freshwater Wetland Protection Act ("Act").
Under the Act, D.R. Horton had twenty days from the date of receipt
of the notice to request a hearing. On November 18, 2004, four days
before the deadline, D.R. Horton mailed a request for a hearing to the
DEP by way of the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). For
reasons not disclosed in the record, the USPS did not deliver the
request until six days later, on November 24, 2004. On December
21, 2004, the DEP notified D.R. Horton that its request for a hearing
was denied because the request was untimely. D.R. Horton appealed.
The substantial compliance doctrine allows a
ANALYSIS:
challenge to agency action to be maintained where the aggrieved
party took reasonable steps to initiate the challenge within the
prescribed period but the agency failed to receive timely notice of the
challenge due to circumstances beyond the aggrieved party's control.
The DEP relied on cases holding that a statutory time limitation for
requesting an adjudicatory hearing is mandatory and jurisdictional.
New Jersey courts, however, have recognized that even strict
statutory limitations on the initiation of legal action are subject to the
substantial compliance doctrine. There is no difference between a
limitation period on the initiation of administrative action and on
judicial action - both restrict the jurisdiction of the forum to provide
the particular relief authorized by the legislature. There is no
legislative intent to preclude application of the substantial
compliance doctrine to the twenty-day deadline. The purposes of
such a requirement are to compel a party aggrieved by agency action
to promptly challenge that action and to give finality to agency action
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that is not challenged in a timely manner. These purposes are not
undermined by the application of the substantial compliance doctrine.
D.R. Horton satisfied the five requirements to establish
substantial compliance of the twenty-day deadline. First, the DEP
was not prejudiced by the receipt of the hearing request two days past
the statutory deadline. Second, D.R. Horton took appropriate steps to
comply with the statute by mailing its request four days before the
deadline. Third, the mailing constituted general compliance with the
purpose of the deadline. Fourth, the mailing provided reasonable
notice of D.R. Horton's claim. Fifth, the fact that D.R. Horton
mailed its hearing request four days before the statutory deadline
provides a reasonable explanation why there was not strict
compliance with the deadline. Regarding the final requirement, the
court took judicial notice that the USPS ordinarily delivers mail
within the state in less than four days. D.R. Horton could have
reasonably expected that mailing the hearing request four days before
the statutory deadline would result in its receipt by the deadline.
Also, the only method by which D.R. Horton could have submitted
its request was by mail since the notice of penalty assessment
provided only a post office mailing address and not a street address
for in-person delivery.
HOLDING: The DEP's final decision denying the request for a
hearing is reversed.
IMPACT: This decision recognizes that there may be circumstances
beyond an aggrieved party's control that prevent strict compliance
with time limitations to request an adjudicatory hearing. It affords
the aggrieved party who takes reasonable steps at compliance with
protection from those circumstances beyond his control.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE COURT

Ins. Fed'n of Pa., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 889 A.2d 550 (Pa. 2005).
LAW: The Pennsylvania Department of Insurance does not have the
authority to require that all auto insurance policies include
mandatory, binding arbitration for uninsured motorist and
underinsured motorist disputes.

Spring 2006

Legal Summaries

FACTS: Enacted in 1963, Pennsylvania's Uninsured Motorist
Clause Act ("UM Act") requires that all auto insurance policies
issued in the state include a provision, approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, for uninsured motorist coverage, unless that coverage
is expressly rejected by the insured. Pursuant to this provision, the
Pennsylvania Insurance Department ("Department") promulgated a
regulation stating that the coverage plan must include an arbitration
clause ("Regulation").
In 1984, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
("MVFRL") was passed, stating that all auto insurance policies must
include a provision for uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist
insurance in order to be approved by the Insurance Commissioner.
In August 1996, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company filed with the
Department a revision to its private passenger insurance policy
covering uninsured motorists and underinsured motorists. That
revision would have eliminated the policy's arbitration provision,
resulting in all such claims disputes being resolved in the courts. The
Department rejected the proposal stating that the removal violated the
Regulation.
The Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania
("Federation") filed a petition before the Department seeking an
order declaring that the Department did not have the authority to
require mandatory arbitration of uninsured motorist and underinsured
motorist coverage disputes.
The Pennsylvania Insurance
Commissioner denied the petition. The Commonwealth Court
affirmed, relying on its prior holding in Prudential Property &
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Muir, 513 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986).
ANALYSIS:
The Pennsylvania legislature did not grant the
Department the express authority in either the UM Act or the
MVFRL to require mandatory, binding arbitration for uninsured
motorist and underinsured motorist claims.
In Muir, the Commonwealth Court held that the Department
had the implied authority to promulgate the regulation in question,
and the authority was derived from the statutory duty to enforce the
UM Act by approving only those policies that provide proper
protection to the victims of uninsured motorists. Public policy,
however, does not create an implied legislative mandate allowing the
Department "to change the normal course of judicial proceedings
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simply because arbitration is less costly and less time-consuming
than traditional litigation."
Authority may be given to an administrative agency to make
rules and regulations to cover "mere matters of detail for the
implementation of a statute." In the UM Act and the MVFRL, the
legislature delegated to the Department and the Insurance
Commissioner the authority to approve or reject all insurance
policies. The Regulation covers more than "mere matters of detail"
for implementing the UM Act or the MVFRL.
Thus, the Department exceeded its statutory authority in requiring
mandatory, binding arbitration in uninsured motorist and
underinsured motorist disputes.
HOLDING: The Commonwealth Court's decision is reversed and
the decision in Muir is overruled.
IMPACT: State agency action is limited to what is expressly or
impliedly authorized by the state legislature. In Pennsylvania, the
Department of Insurance cannot promulgate a regulation under a
statute that does not give it authority to do so even if the goal of the
regulation is to further that statute's public policy. Rather, authority
to do so must be expressly or impliedly added to statutory law by the
legislature.
TENNESSEE STATE COURT

Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292 (Tenn. 2005).
LAW: Procedures in Tennessee's lethal injection protocol are not
"rules" subject to promulgation requirements under the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act.
FACTS: In 1987, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Davidson County,
Tennessee.
On April 3, 2002, while federal habeas corpus
proceedings were ongoing, Abdur'Rahman asked the Commissioner
of Correction in Tennessee ("Commissioner") to issue a declaratory
order regarding the constitutionality, legality, and applicability of the
Tennessee Department of Correction's ("DOC") lethal injection
protocol. On May 28, 2002, the Commissioner denied the request.

Spring 2006

Legal Summaries

On July 26, 2002, Abdur'Rahman filed an action challenging the
DOC's lethal injection protocol in the Chancery Court for Davidson
County on several constitutional and non-constitutional grounds,
including the claim that the procedures in the lethal injection protocol
were "rules" adopted by the DOC in violation of the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act ("UAPA"). The Chancellor dismissed
the non-constitutional claims, and found that Abdur'Rahman failed to
demonstrate that Tennessee's method of lethal injection was
unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed.
ANALYSIS: The UAPA requires a state agency in Tennessee to
follow uniform procedures when making rules. These detailed
procedures govern public hearings on the content of proposed rules,
the conduct of those hearings, approval of the rules by the Attorney
General, filing of the rules with the Secretary of State, and
publication in the administrative register. The legal injection
protocol is not subject to the requirements of the UAPA for several
reasons.
First, the lethal injection protocol is not a rule as defined by
the UAPA. It is not an "agency statement of general applicability
that implements or prescribes a law or policy or describes the
procedures or practice requirements of any agency." Instead, the
protocol fits within two exceptions to the meanings of "rule" - (1)
statements concerning only the internal management of state
government and not affecting private rights, privileges, or procedures
available to the public, and (2) statements concerning inmates of a
correctional or detention facility.
Second, the court has previously held that the DOC's prison
disciplinary procedures are not "rules" under the UAPA. The
legislature has provided the DOC considerable deference and broad
discretionary powers to enable the DOC to manage its
Moreover, the court concluded that the
responsibilities.
promulgation requirements of public notice, public hearing, attorney
general approval, and filing with the state are simply not realistic
requirements for implementing procedures that concern the
intricacies and complexities of a prison environment.
Finally, Abdur'Rahman relied on Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-23-114(c), which states that the DOC "is authorized to
promulgate necessary rules and regulations to facilitate the
implementation of this statute." Virtually all other statutes in the

360

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

26-1

Tennessee Code that authorize the promulgation of rules and
regulations expressly refer to the UAPA. The UAPA is inapplicable
here because of the absence of an express reference to the UAPA in
section 40-23-114(c).
Accordingly, the procedures in the lethal injection protocol
are not "rules" adopted by the DOC in violation of the UAPA.
The court also found that the lethal injection protocol in Tennessee
did not violate the Eighth Amendment, did not violate due process,
did not deny access to the courts, did not violate the Nonlivestock
Animal Human Death act, did not violate the provisions governing
the practice of medicine and provision of healthcare services, and did
not violate the Drug Control Act or Pharmacy Practice Act.
HOLDING: The court of appeal's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT:
fulfilling its
procedures,
Department
requirements

State agency action is afforded great deference when
responsibilities within the prison environment. Any
protocol, rules, or regulations that the Tennessee
of Correction promulgates are not subject to
under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.

